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Abstract
In this paper we study the economic determinants of the inter-sectoral distribution of skilled workers
and the long-run consequences of imperfect competition on growth within an R&D-based growth model
with human capital accumulation. We find that steady-state growth is driven only by incentives to
accumulate human capital and is independent of scale effects. In the model imperfect competition has a
positive growth effect, while influencing the allocation of human capital to the different economic
activities. Contrary to general wisdom, high R&D investment is not always associated with high output
growth.
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Introduction
Recent theoretical and empirical advancements in the endogenous growth literature suggest
that not only Research and Development (R&D) activity, but also human capital accumulation is a
primary determinant of economic development. However, while in the R&D-based growth models
an important (and recent) research line has already investigated whether the presence of imperfect
competition in the product market may be growth-enhancing or not,1 this has not yet been done
within an integrated economic growth model with R&D and human capital accumulation. Still,
another issue that has been largely neglected by this branch of growth literature is the analysis of
the economic determinants of the sectoral distribution of human capital when this factor input is
allowed to grow over time.
The aim of this paper is to fill these gaps in the literature. In order to do this it combines in the
simplest possible way the basic Lucas (1988) model of human capital accumulation with (a
generalization of) the Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch. 3, pp. 43/57) model of endogenous
technical change without knowledge spillovers. The reason why we concentrate on this last
peculiar model is simple. We are interested in studying the nexus between market power
(measured by the elasticity of substitution among different varieties of capital goods) and growth
and the main forces underlying the inter-sectoral allocation of skilled workers within an economy
where the true lever to economic development is schooling investment and not the R&D
externality.2
In more detail, we consider a model economy that is made up of a representative household and
firms. For simplicity purposes the representative household consists of only one agent who is
involved in four types of activities: consumption goods production, intermediate goods
manufacturing, human capital investment and R&D effort. Population is stationary in the economy
and consumption goods are produced within a perfectly competitive environment in which prices
are taken as given and each input is compensated according to its own marginal product. The
intermediate goods sector consists of monopolistic producers of differentiated products entering
                                               
1 See, among others, Aghion and Howitt (1996, 1997, 1998a,b), Aghion et al. (1997a,b), van de Klundert and
Smulders (1995, 1997), Bucci (2002a).
2 What happens to the market power/growth nexus and the inter-sectoral allocation of human capital in a model
where there is no human capital accumulation and the true engine of growth is represented by the externality in the
R&D activity is deeply studied in Bucci (2002a).2
the production function of the homogeneous final good as an input. The representative household
invests portions of its fixed-time endowment to acquire formal education. Finally, in the model
purposive R&D activity is the source of technological progress. Technical progress happens,
indeed, through inventing new varieties of horizontally differentiated capital goods within a
separate and competitive R&D sector. When a new blueprint is discovered in the R&D sector, an
intermediate-goods producer acquires the perpetual patent over it. This allows the intermediate
firm to manufacture the new variety and practice monopoly pricing forever. A peculiarity of this
economic system is that all the sectors do employ skilled workers. This is done because, as already
mentioned, it is one of our objectives to study in detail the economic determinants of the inter-
sectoral distribution of human capital when this factor input is allowed to grow over time, thus
spurring economic growth.
Our main findings are threefold. First of all, as in the basic Lucas (1988) model, human capital
accumulation depends on the parameters describing preferences and the skill acquisition
technology. However, unlike Lucas (1988), the presence of imperfect competition conditions in
the intermediate products market both has growth effects and influences the allocation of the
available human capital stock to the different sectors employing this input. Secondly, as it is
common in recent endogenous growth theory,3 our model does not display any scale effect, since
growth does not depend on the total available human capital stock. Finally, we find that the
relationship between the equilibrium output growth rate and the share of resources (human
capital) invested in R&D activity is absolutely non-monotonic and crucially depends on the
productivity of the schooling technology.
Our analysis here is related to other works, both in its scope and its methodological approach.
Arnold (1998) also develops an endogenous growth model that integrates purposive R&D activity
with human capital accumulation and where the true engine of growth is represented by the
investment in schooling. But his work is mainly motivated by the attempt of rejecting, on
theoretical grounds, two main predictions of standard growth models based on R&D (namely that
the equilibrium growth rate is very much sensitive to policy changes and to the level of resources
used in research). Blackburn et alii (2000) extend Arnold’s model in the direction of a fuller
micro-foundation of the R&D process and obtain the same results with no further new insights.
                                               
3 See Eicher and Turnovsky (1999) for a detailed discussion on non-scale models of economic growth.3
However, both these two works do not deal at all with the determinants of the inter-sectoral
allocation of skilled workers and with the long-run influences of imperfect competition on growth.
Indeed, in Blackburn et alii (2000) intermediate firms do not employ directly human capital, since
they use forgone consumption to produce. This is the main reason why we consider that
framework as truly inadequate to answer the questions we would like to answer in this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, and within a similar framework, this is one of the first attempts
in this direction. In this respect, we should probably mention a recent paper by Jones and Williams
(2000) aimed at analysing whether a decentralised economy undertakes too little or too much
R&D in the presence of some distortions to the research activity.4 Still, in this paper there is no
human capital accumulation, no evaluation of the possible long-run links between (im)perfect
competition and growth and capital goods and research are produced devoting units of foregone
consumption. Finally, other two works that come closer to ours are Bucci (2001, 2002b). The
main difference with respect to the first of these two papers is that the present contribution
endogenises the shares of human capital devoted to each economic activity (that are kept
exogenous in that approach), whereas the difference with respect to the second one is that this
paper does represent a simple generalization of it (encompassing it as a special case).5
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the basic model and in
Section 2 we study the general equilibrium of it. Section 3 examines the steady-state properties of
the economy under investigation and in Section 4 we compute the equilibrium output growth rate.
In Section 5, we solve for the inter-sectoral allocation of human capital, present some comparative
statics results about the main economic determinants of the shares of the reproducible input
                                               
4 These distortions are represented respectively by the surplus appropriability problem, the presence of knowledge
spillovers and the creative destruction  and congestion externalities.
5 Other works that take explicitly into account the interaction between endogenous technological change and
human capital formation are Stokey (1988) and Young (1993), Grossman and Helpman (1991, Ch.5.2), and Eicher
(1996), Redding (1996) and Restuccia (1997). Though, all these remain limited in many respects. In the first two
(Stokey, 1988 and Young, 1993), for example, skill accumulation happens through learning-by-doing and on-the-
job-training in the production activity, rather than a separate education sector. In Grossman and Helpman (1991,
Ch.5.2), a separate education sector does exist but, strangely enough, it does not require any skilled worker to
operate. Eicher (1996) develops a rich model in which both human capital and technological innovation are
endogenous. However, this paper is solely concerned with steady-state predictions on the relationship between
relative supply of skilled labour and relative wage. Restuccia (1997), on the other hand, builds a dynamic general
equilibrium model with schooling and technology adoption. But the primary concern of the paper is to study how
these two elements may be amplifying the effects of productivity differences on income disparity. Finally, Redding
(1996) emphasises the potential interaction between investment in education and investment in research and shows
under which conditions such an interaction may give rise to co-ordination problems and under-development traps.4
(skilled work) devoted to each economic activity and briefly discuss the most important findings.
Section 6 presents the results concerning the steady-state predictions of the model concerning the
relationship between the type of production functions (employed in the downstream sector), the
sectoral distribution of human capital, imperfect competition and growth in some selected cases
and finally Section 7 concludes.
1.  The Model Economy
Consider an economy with three different productive sectors. There exists an undifferentiated
consumers good, which is produced using skilled labour and capital goods (intermediate inputs).
These are available, at time  t, in  t n  different varieties. In order to produce such inputs,
intermediate firms employ only human capital. Technical progress takes place as a continuous
expansion, through purposive Research and Development (R&D) activity, of the set of available
horizontally differentiated intermediates. R&D is skill intensive as well. Unlike the traditional
R&D-based growth models, I assume that the supply of human capital may grow over time. In this
connection, following the pathbreaking papers by Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988), I postulate the
existence of a representative household that chooses plans for consumption (c), asset holdings (a,
to be defined later) and human capital (h). For the sake of simplicity, I also assume that the
representative household of this economy has unit measure. In the model there is no physical
capital and unskilled labour. Human capital is a homogeneous input and can be employed to
produce the final output, intermediates, new human capital and to invent new varieties of capital
goods (research).
1.1 The Consumers Good Sector
The homogeneous, undifferentiated consumers good is produced within a competitive industry.
Such an industry is populated by a large number of identical firms and employs the following
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As in Bucci (2002a), we have written the production technology in use in the downstream sector
in such a way to disentangle the (equilibrium) monopolistic mark-up set in the intermediate sector
and the degree of returns from specialization.6 Another reason why we employ the production
function of equation (1) is that this technology allows to encompass as particular cases (and
depending on the value of  l ) two recent models of endogenous growth7 (one of which is not
R&D-based) that in their original version do not include human capital accumulation. Even with
respect to these models we are interested to study in this paper their potential implications (as for
the monopoly power/growth relationship and the sectoral distribution of human capital) when a
positive supply of skilled workers is explicitly introduced in them.
Unlike Bucci (2002a), we take here a different view by considering an economy where the true
lever to economic development is human capital accumulation (and not the R&D externality). In
addition, another important difference with that paper is that we want to find out here the
equilibrium inter-sectoral allocation of human capital in terms of shares (and not stocks) of this
(growing) factor input being devoted to each sector in the steady-state  and analyse its main
economic determinants.
According to equation (1), output at time t ( t Y ) is obtained combining skilled work ( Yt H ) and
n different varieties of intermediate inputs, each of which is employed in the quantity  xj . a ,  l
and  A are technological parameters. The latter (total factor productivity) is strictly positive,
whereas  l  is (not strictly) between zero and one. The restriction on  a  assures that in a
symmetric equilibrium the istantaneous profit accruing to a generic intermediate producer at a
certain point in time is inversely related to the number of varieties existing at the same date.
                                               
6 This point is made clear by Benassy (1998, p. 63). Indeed, in a moment we will show that (under additional
assumptions) the mark-up charged over the marginal cost by the monopolistic producers of intermediate inputs is
1/a . At the same time, from equation (1), it is possible to see that in a symmetric equilibrium (in which the total
production of intermediates, X, is spread evenly between the n brands) the degree of returns to specialization (the
exponent of n) is equal to  ) 1 / 1 ( - a l . This one is clearly different from the monopoly power measure and, more
importantly, depends not only on a  but also on  l . In this sense, the model we present here is a simple extension
of Bucci (2002b).
7 Namely the Rebelo’s (1991) and Grossman and Helpman’s (1991, Ch. 3, pp. 43/57) models.6
Since the industry is competitive, in equilibrium each variety of intermediates receives its own
marginal product (in terms of the numeraire good, the final output):
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In equation (2)  pjt  represents the inverse demand function faced, at time t, by the generic j-th
intermediate producer. As it is common in the first generation innovation-based growth literature,
the elasticity of substitution between two generic intermediates coincides with the price-demand
elasticity faced by each capital goods producer and is equal to  ) 1 /( 1 a - .8
1.2 The Intermediate Goods Sector
The capital goods industry is  monopolistically competitive and each intermediate input is
produced using the same technology:
(3)    jt jt h B x ￿ = , ( ) t n j , 0 ˛ " , B>0.
This production function is characterised by constant returns to scale in the only input
employed (human capital) and, according to it, one unit of skills is able to produce (at each time)
the same constant quantity of whatever variety. B measures the productivity of human capital
employed in this sector. Following Romer (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap.3), we
continue to assume that each intermediate good embodies a design created in the R&D sector and
that there exists a patent law which prohibits any firm from manufacturing an intermediate good
without the consent of the patent holder of the design.
The generic j-th firm maximises (with respect to  jt x ) its own instantaneous profit function
under the (inverse) demand constraint (equation (2)).
                                               
8 This result is obtained under the specific assumption that each firm producing intermediate inputs is so small that
a marginal increase in the quantity of output it produces does not change the quantities produced by its market
rivals and, then, total intermediate output.7
Continuing to assume that in the intermediate sector there exists no strategic interaction among
firms, the resolution of this maximisation program gives the optimal price set by the generic j-th









From equations (4) and (2), the wage rate accruing at time t to one unit of human capital
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In a symmetric equilibrium (where  t jt x x = ,  ) , 0 ( t n j ˛ " ), each local monopolist faces the same
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The hypothesis of symmetry is dictated by the way through which each variety of intermediates
enters the final output technology and by the fact that all the capital goods producers use the same
production function (equation (3)).
Hence, when all the capital goods firms are identical, they produce the same quantity ( t x ), face
the same wage rate accruing to intermediate skilled workers ( jt w ) and fix the same price for one
unit of their own output. The price is equal to a constant mark-up ( a / 1 ) over the marginal cost
( B w jt / ). In equilibrium the wage rate accruing to one unit of human capital employed in the
intermediate sector ( jt w ) will be the same (and equal to  t w ) for all the sectors where this factor
input is employed. This is due to the hypothesis that skilled workers are homogeneous in this
model economy (they have the same productivity irrespective of the economic activity they
perform).
Defining by  ￿ ”
t n
jt jt dj h H
0
 the total amount of human capital employed in the intermediate
sector at time t and under the assumption of symmetry among capital goods producers ( t jt x x = ,
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Finally, the instantaneous profit function of a generic j-th intermediate firm will be:
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Since we are dealing with a monopolistic competition market,  p will be decreasing in n  (the
number of intermediate firms existing at time t) if and only if  l l a + > 1 / . This explains the
restriction on a  we have introduced in equation (1).
Equation (6) says that, just as x and p, so too the instantaneous profit is equal for each variety
of intermediates in a symmetric equilibrium.
1.3 The Research Sector
Producing the generic j-th variety of capital goods entails the purchase of a specific blueprint
(the j-th one) from the competitive research sector, characterised by the following aggregate
technology:
(7)  nt t H C n ￿ =
•
, C>0,
where  t n  denotes the number of capital goods varieties existing at time t,  n H  is the total amount
of human capital employed in the sector and C is the productivity of the research skilled workers.
The production function of new ideas coincides with the one employed by Grossman and Helpman
(1991) in their Chapter 3 model without knowledge spillovers (pp.43-57). It implies that in the
present framework knowledge is a completely private good (the returns to the discovery of a new
blueprint are fully appropriated by the inventor9) and  non-cumulative  (in order
                                               
9 Indeed, in our model it is assumed that there exists a perfect patent protection system (based on infinitely-lived
patents) that allows the successfull innovator to accrue the whole gains from his/her R&D efforts and prevents
someone from imitating (or even from innovating around the original innovation). See Bucci and Saglam (2000)
for a model of endogenous growth where patent lifetime is not infinite.9
to invent new varieties of intermediate inputs only skilled labour is employed and not also the
available stock of disembodied technological capital approximated by the existing number of
designs). In the original Grossman and Helpman’s model without knowledge spillovers this
specification of the R&D process implies the cessation of growth in the log run. In our model,
instead, this does not happen since in our economy the true engine of growth is represented by
human capital accumulation (and not by the R&D externality). In this sense the model we present
here shares the same conclusions of many other models with purposive R&D activity and skills
accumulation.10 At the same time we think that concentrating our attention in the main text on the
simple R&D technology of equation (7) helps in avoiding potential complications concerning the
nature of knowledge spillovers, the way these last are to be more appropriately modelled and the
problem of technology diffusion. In this respect, it is well known that the empirical (IO) literature
on knowledge spillovers is almost unbounded and particularly controversial. Griliches (1992), for
example, supports the idea that such spillovers are quite important in the R&D process. On the
other hand, the surveys by Keely and Quah (1998) and Keely (2001) cast many doubts on the
strength of R&D spillovers in real life (both at the micro and macro level).11 On the basis of such
inconclusive empirical results it is a fair conclusion that our hypothesis on the R&D capital
aggregate production function seems to be as extreme as the (opposite) one of immediate and
instantaneous spillovers in innovation activity and generally adopted by the pathbreaking R&D-
based growth models (Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991, Chap. 3, pp. 57-65; Aghion
and Howitt, 1992).
As the research sector is competitive, new firms will enter it till when all profit opportunities
will be completely exhausted. The zero profit condition amounts, in this case, to set:




                                               
10 Notably Arnold (1998) and Blackburn et al. (2000).
11 At the micro level Keely and Quah (1998) conclude that  “…knowledge spillovers do occur. However, the
physical clustering of innovation suggests that spillovers do not happen automatically or completely” (p. 24). At
the macro level, instead, they notice that “…spillovers across regions do occur. At the same time, however, these
spillovers are generally incomplete” (p. 25). According to Keely (2001): ”…Although in principle a patent’s
information spills over to other firms, there is a large empirical literature that suggests such spillovers are in
practice neither so immediate nor widespread” (p.5).10
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Symbols used in equations (8) and (9) have the following meaning:  n w  is the wage rate accruing









ds s r exp is a present value factor
which converts a unit of profit at time t  into an equivalent unit of profit at time t; r is the real rate
of return on the consumers’ asset holdings;  j p  is the profit accruing to the j-th intermediate
producer (once the j-th infinitely-lived patent has been acquired) and  n V  is the market value of one
unit of research output (the generic j-th idea allowing to produce the j-th variety of capital goods).
Notice that  n V  is equal to the discounted present value of the profit flow a local monopolist can
potentially earn from t to infinity and coincides with the market value of the j-th intermediate firm
(since there is a one to one relationship between number of patents and number of capital goods
producers).
1.4 Consumers
We consider a closed economy in which there exists only one representative infinitely-lived
household that holds assets in the form of ownership claims on firms and chooses plans for
consumption (c), asset holdings (a) and human capital (h). For the sake of simplicity, I assume that
the only household populating this economy has unit measure and there is no population growth.
This hypothesis implies that, at each t, the household’s own stock of human capital (h) equals the
economy aggregate stock of this factor input (H). Following Lucas (1988), we also assume that
the household is endowed with one unit of time and optimally allocates a fraction u of its time
endowment to productive activities (research, capital goods and consumer goods production) and
the remaining fraction (1-u) to non-productive activities (schooling). As it will be clearer later on,
given the household’s choice of the optimal u (that we denote by u*), the labour market clearing
conditions will determine the decentralised allocation of the productive human capital between
manufacturing of intermediate and consumers goods and invention of new ideas (research).11
With an instantaneous utility function  ) log( ) ( t t c c u = , the decision problem of the household
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The control variables of this problem are  t c  and  t u , whereas  t a  and  t h  are the state variables.
Equation (10) is the intertemporal utility function; equation (11) is the budget constraint and
equation (12) represents the human capital supply function.12 The symbols used have the following
meaning:  r  is the subjective discount rate; c denotes consumption of the homogeneous final
good; w is the wage rate accruing to one unit of skilled labour13 and d  is a parameter reflecting
the productivity of the education technology.
With  t 1 m  and  t 2 m  denoting respectively the shadow price of the household’s asset holdings and
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Equation (13) gives the discounted marginal utility of consumption, which satisfies the dynamic
optimality condition in equation (15). Equation (14) is the static optimality condition for the
allocation of time, equating the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of an additional unit of
skills devoted to working. The marginal cost involves the cost associated with future reductions in
human capital, as expressed by the other dynamic optimality condition in equation (16).
                                               
12 Notice that we assume no depreciation for human capital. This hypothesis is completely harmless in the present
context and serves the scope of simplifying the analysis. Also notice that we consider the variant of the basic Lucas
model (1988) in which spillovers from education are internalised. This is done because we are explicitly assuming
that there is only one household (of unit measure) within this economy and population is stationary.
13 In equilibrium there exists only one wage rate accruing to skilled workers since human capital is homogeneous.12
Conditions (13) through (16) must satisfy the constraints (11) and (12), together with the
transversality conditions:
0 lim 1 =
¥ ﬁ t t t a m ;  0 lim 2 =
¥ ﬁ t t t h m
2.  General Equilibrium
In order to find out the equilibrium of the model under the symmetry hypothesis
t t jt jt x n H B x = ￿ = / ( ,  )) , 0 ( t n j˛ "  first notice that, for given u* (the optimal fraction of skills
devoted by consumers to production activities), the optimal allocation of human capital among
research, capital and consumers goods production is found solving simultaneously the following
labour market clearing conditions:
(17)  H u H H H n j Y * = + + ,  t "
(18a) n j w w =  
(18b)  Y j w w =
Since human capital is perfectly homogeneous in the model, we impose that: 1) it is paid the
same wage rate across all the productive sectors where this input is employed (equations (18a)
and (18b)); 2) the sum of the human capital stocks allocated to each market is equal to the total
stock of productive human capital available at time t (equation (17)).
Since the total value of the household’s assets must equal the total value of firms, the following
condition must be checked in a symmetric equilibrium:
 (19)  n nV a =     
where  n V  is given by (9) and satisfies the following asset pricing equation:
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Recall that one new idea allows a new intermediate firm to produce one new variety of capital
goods. In other words, there exists a one-to-one relationship between number of ideas, number of
capital goods producers and number of intermediate input varieties. This explains why, in equation
(19), the total value of the household’s assets (a) is equal to the number of profit-making
intermediate firms (n) times the market value ( n V ) of each of them (equal to the market value of
the corresponding idea). Equation (19a) simply suggests that the interest on the value of the j-th
generic intermediate firm  ) ( n rV  should be equal, in equilibrium, to the sum of two terms:
-  the instantaneous monopoly profit ( j p ) coming from the production of the j-th capital good;
-  the capital gain or loss matured on  n V  during the time interval dt ( n V
•
).
We can now move to the steady-state equilibrium.
3.  Steady State Equilibrium
In this paragraph we characterise the steady state (or balanced growth path) equilibrium of the
model. We first start with a formal definition of balanced growth path equilibrium:
Definition: Balanced Growth Path (or Steady-State) Equilibrium
A balanced growth path (or steady state) equilibrium is an equilibrium where the growth rate of
all the variables depending on time is constant, human (H) and knowledge (n) capital are
complements ( t t n H R / ”  is constant at each time t) and  Y H ,  j H ,  n H  all grow at the same
constant rate as H.14 
                                               
14 The hypothesis that human and technological capital are complements (the value of the ratio  t t n H R / =
remains invariant along the balanced growth path) may be justified on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
From the theoretical point of view, Redding (1996) clearly shows that the complementarity relationship between
skilled workers and technology does represent a crucial element in explaining the existence of poverty traps in
many less developed countries, due to the joint presence of low levels of skills and R&D investment in these areas.
He also shows that, under particular conditions, the complementarity hypothesis between human capital and R&D
is also responsible for the existence of multiple steady states. On the empirical side, instead, many contributions
claim the relevance of the skill-technology connections even at the sectoral level (Goldin and Katz, 1998), whereas
de la Fuente and da Rocha (1996) also find evidence of strong complementarities between human capital stock and
investment in R&D for the OECD countries.14
With this definition of balanced growth path, when  H g  (the growth rate of H) is constant u is
constant as well (see equation (12)).15 This means that, along a balanced growth path, the
household will optimally decide to devote a constant fraction of its fixed time endowment to
working (u*) and education (1-u*) activities. Solving explicitly the consumers’ problem, it is
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According to result (20), the real interest rate (r) is constant. Equation (21) states that along a
balanced growth path, the number of new ideas (n), the household’s total human capital stock (H)
and the human capital stocks devoted respectively to the consumers good production ( Y H ), to the
intermediate sector ( j H ) and to research ( n H ) all grow at the same constant rate, given by the
difference between the schooling technology productivity parameter (d ) and the subjective
discount rate ( r ). Equation (22) gives the equilibrium growth rate of consumption and
household’s asset holdings. Equations (23) and (24), instead, give respectively the equilibrium
values of the constant  n H j /   and  n HY /  ratios, whereas equation (25) represents the optimal
constant fraction of the household’s time endowment that it will decide to allocate to working
activities (u*). For the growth rate of the variables in equations (21) and (22) to be positive and
bounded,  d  should be strictly greater than  r  and bounded. The condition  r d >  also assures
that  1 * 0 < < u .
                                               
15 As already said in paragraph 1.4, given the assumptions on the size of the representative household and the
population growth rate, h”H  (which implies that we can use  H g  instead of  h g ).15
4.  Endogenous Growth
To compute the output growth rate of this economy in a symmetric, balanced growth




































Then, taking logs of both sides of this expression, totally differentiating with respect to time and
recalling that in the steady-state equilibrium  r d - = = = H n H g g g
Y  (see equation (21) above),
we obtain:
(1a)  [ ] ) ( ) 1 ( 1
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Hence, economic growth depends only on a  (the inverse of which can be easily interpreted as
a measure of the monopoly power enjoyed by each intermediate local monopolist),  l (which
represents the share of total income being devoted in a symmetric equilibrium to the purchase of
all the available capital goods varieties16) and the accumulation rate of human capital ( H g ). In this
last respect the model supports the main conclusion of that branch of the endogenous growth
literature pioneered by Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988).17 As a consequence, and in line with this
literature, our analysis does not display any scale effect, since  Y g  depends neither on the absolute
dimension of the economy (its total human capital stock), nor on the population growth rate (that,
indeed, is equal to zero in our model).18













17 Benhabib and Spiegel (1994), Islam (1995) and Pritchett (1996) all suggest that, unlike Lucas (1988),
international differences in per-capita growth rates depend exclusively on differences in the respective human
capital stocks each country is endowed with. However, Jones (1995a,b) points out that the scale effect hypothesis
should be rejected on empirical grounds.
18 The no-scale-effect prediction is indeed shared by many other models (e.g. Kortum, 1997; Aghion and Howitt,
1998a, Chap. 12; Dinopoulos and Thompson, 1998; Peretto and Smulders, 1998; Segerstrom, 1998; Young, 1998;
Howitt, 1999; Blackburn et al., 2000; Bucci, 2001, among others). See Jones (1999) and Eicher and Turnovsky
(1999) for recent surveys.16
As it is usual in this class of (symmetric) growth models with horizontal product differentiation,
in the expression for the equilibrium growth rate of output the term  ) 1 ( - b l  measures the returns
to specialization. Notice that such returns depend (positively) not only on  b (the monopoly
power), but also on l . The intuition behind this result is simple: the higher the mark-up rate that
can be charged over the marginal cost in the monopolistic sector and the share of national income
spent on the intermediate inputs, the higher the returns an intermediate producer may obtain from
specialising in the production of the marginal variety of capital goods. Additionally, it is probably
worth pointing out that b enters the equilibrium growth rate when (and only when) l  is not equal
to zero (i.e. when capital goods are an input in the production of the final good). This is clear
when one considers that the only product market where imperfect competition prevails is the
intermediate one in the model.
Since I am particularly interested in analysing those factors potentially able to influence the
inter-sectoral competition for the acquisition of human capital in the present context, we have first
to determine an expression for the equilibrium human to technological capital ratio ( n H R / ” ).
At this aim, we use equation (17), with  d r / *= u ,  C n H j ) 1 /( / a ad - =  and






































Equating the last expression above to equation (21) yields:
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In the next section, I compute the equilibrium shares of human capital devoted to research ( n s ),
capital goods production ( j s ), final good manufacturing ( Y s ) and human capital accumulation
( H s ).17
5.  Human Capital, R&D and Growth
Given R, the shares of human capital devoted to each sector employing this factor input in the
decentralised long-run equilibrium are the following:
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5.1.   Some Comparative Statics Results
From equation (28) it is possible to state the following comparative statics results (in this
section I’ll assume  0 > H g , which implies  0 > > r d , and  1 0 < < l . Later on I will analyse what
happens to the main variables of the model under the special cases  0 = l  and  1 = l ):





















Equations (28a) through (28d) say that the equilibrium share of human capital devoted to
capital goods production depends negatively on the human capital accumulation productivity
parameter (d ) and positively on a , the subjective discount rate ( r ) and the share of total income
devoted to the purchase of intermediate inputs. I am particularly interested in investigating the
impact that the monopoly position enjoyed by each local intermediate producer (and measured by
the elasticity of substitution among capital goods) may have on the main variables of the model in
the long-run equilibrium. At this aim, first notice that  a / 1  does represent, as already mentioned,
the optimal mark-up rate charged over the marginal cost by the intermediate producers and
accordingly it can be used as a measure of the degree of monopoly power present in the
uncompetitive sector. The higher a , the higher the elasticity of substitution between two generic18
intermediate inputs (equal to  ) 1 /( 1 a - ). This means that they become more and more alike when
a  grows and, as a consequence, the price elasticity of the derived demand curve faced by a local
monopolist (equal, again, to  ) 1 /( 1 a - ) tends to be infinitely large when  a  tends to one. In a
word, the toughness of competition in the intermediate sector is strictly (and positively) depending
on the level of  a . Conversely, the inverse of  a  ( a / 1 ), can be viewed as a proxy for how
uncompetitive the sector is.
Intuitively, what equation (28a) tells us is that when a  increases, the degree of competition
within the capital goods market increases and, then, the aggregate intermediate output and the
human capital demand coming from this sector do increase as well ( j s  goes up). Therefore, a re-
allocation of the available human capital among all the sectors employing this input does happen.
As for the equilibrium share of  human capital devoted to the consumers good sector, we
conclude that:





















Hence, unlike what happens for  j s , now an increase in the mark-up rate does increase the
decentralised equilibrium share of human capital devoted to the production of the final good.
Again, the economic intuition behind this result is quite simple: an increase in the mark-up rate
(and in this way in the price) of all the intermediate inputs,  ceteris paribus, makes it more
profitable for the final good producers to substitute human capital for capital goods. As a
consequence, the demand for this factor input ( Y H ) increases and, for given total human capital
stock,  Y s  increases as well. The effects of  r  and d  on  Y s  are exactly the same as those found on
j s . Finally, an increase in  l  pushes unambiguously  Y s  down. This happens because when  l
rises, then the investment (in terms of human capital sectoral shares) in the capital goods and R&D
sectors grows up, whereas it remains unchanged in the education sector (as we will show in a
moment).
Coming now to the comparative statics results for the equilibrium share of human capital
devoted to R&D activity ( n s ), we find that:19






This means that the impact that the intermediate sector monopoly power exerts upon  n s  is
unambiguously positive. This result is intuitively explained as follows: a higher mark-up increases,
ceteris paribus, the flow of profits accruing to intermediate producers, which in turn increases the
market value of one unit of research output (a new design), raising the share of the available
human capital devoted to R&D. Thus, this paper extends one of the main results of Jones and
Williams (2000)19 to a framework where human capital may be accumulated over time and all the
sectors employ skilled workers.
On the contrary, concerning the effect that d  and  r  do have on  n s , it is possible to see that it
is not unambiguous and crucially depends on the absolute value of the human capital accumulation
productivity parameter (d ). Indeed:










   when    ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d r - - + < < ;










   when  ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d - - + > .
In addition:






This result seems particularly intuitive since it says that when the share of total income which goes
to the purchase of capital goods increases, then the share of resources devoted to R&D (in order
to invent new varieties of intermediate inputs) increases as well.
The comparative statics results for  H s  and R are as follows:















































                                               
19 In Jones and Williams (2000) there is no human capital accumulation and the inter-sectoral competition for the
same resource (foregone consumption) is restricted to the intermediate and research sectors. However, as in the
present model, in Jones and Williams (2000) the mark-up is determined by the elasticity of substitution between
intermediate capital goods, too.20
The share of human capital devoted to education activity ( H s ) is completely independent on a
and l  (depending only on the technological and preference parameters, respectively d   and  r ).
On the other side, the ratio of human to technological capital (R) depends negatively on C20 and
l  and positively on a .21
Below I report a table that summarizes in a more compact way all the comparative statics
results:22
d r l a
n
H
R ” n s j s Y s H s Y g
( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d r - - + < < › + + - - + +
( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d - - + > › + - - - + +
( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d r - - + < < › - - + + - -
( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d - - + > › - + + + - -
( ) 1 ; 0 ˛ "l › - + + - 0 +
( ) 1 ; 0 ˛ "a › + - + - 0 -
Table 1: Comparative Statics Results Summary
                                               
20 The higher the research human capital productivity, the higher the number of capital goods invented until a
certain date, the lower R. A similar effect also explains the negative impact of l on R.
21 R can also be written as  n H s C s ￿ ￿ / d .We already know that when a  increases  n s  increases as well (whereas
H s  does not change). At the same time, when a  increases  n s  decreases (whereas  H s  does not change). From
these effects the impact of  l  and a  on R follows immediately.
22 In the first and second row of Table 1 I see what happens to R,  n s ,  j s ,  Y s ,  H s  and  Y g  when d  increases and
falls respectively in the following two intervals: 1) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d r - - + < <  and 2) ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d - - + > . In
rows number 3 and 4 I do the same with  r . Finally, in the last two rows I analyse respectively what happens in the
long run equilibrium to the main variables of the model when l  and a  do increase.21
5.2.   The inter-sectoral allocation of human capital: a discussion
Looking at Table 1 (first row), one can see that when ( ) ) 1 ( 1 1 a l r d r - - + < < , then R,  n s ,
H s  and  Y g  are positively correlated to each other23 and that there exists a negative relationship
between  n s  and  H s , on the one side, and  j s  and  Y s , on the other. Clearly, this means that, within
the above mentioned interval, when the productivity of human capital in the education sector
increases, then the economy will allocate more resources to education and research and less
resources to intemediates and final output production. This, in turn, has the effect to boost
economic growth (which in the model depends on the investment in schooling) and to make
human capital relatively abundant with respect to technological capital (R increases).24
On the other hand, when  d  is sufficiently high ( ) 1 ( 1 1 ( a l r d - - + > )), there exists a
positive relationship between  n s ,  j s  and  Y s  and a negative relationship between these variables
and  H s , R and  Y g . Hence, the hypothesis one can infer is that when human capital is particularly
productive in the education sector, further increases in d  push the investment in formation up and
reduce the investment (in terms of human capital) in the other three sectors competing for the
same input. All this leads to an increase in both the steady state growth rate of the economy and
the ratio R.
The effect that an increase in  r  has on the main variables of the model is perfectly consistent
with what we have just said: in the interval ) 1 ( 1 1 ( a l r d r - - + < < ) there exists a positive
relationship between R,  n s ,  H s  and  Y g  and a negative relationship between these variables and
j s  and  Y s . Instead, in the interval  ) 1 ( 1 1 ( a l r d - - + > , the relationship linking R,  H s  and  Y g
is positive, whereas the relationship linking these variables with  n s ,  j s  and  Y s  is negative.
Overall, the result comes out that, contrary to Jones and Williams (2000) where the steady state
share of R&D is monotonically increasing in the steady state output growth rate, the relationship
                                               
23 In this section by positively (negatively) “correlated” we mean that a certain set of endogenous variables move in
the same (different) direction of the exogenous shock that hits an exogenous variable.
24 Evidently R can also be written as: 
C s
R
j ) 1 ( a
ad
-
= . An increase in d  determines an increase in the numerator,
a reduction in the denominator (through the effect on  j s ) and an unambiguous increase in R.22
between  n s  and  Y g  is non-monotonic in a context where human capital is allowed to grow over
time through optimizing behaviour of rational agents and skills and technological capital are
complements to each other in the steady-state equilibrium. The result stated by Jones and Williams
remains true in the present context only when the productivity parameter of human capital
accumulation is sufficiently low. The intuition behind this result is the following: when human
capital is particularly productive in the education sector, a decentralised economy will invest more
resources in this last sector rather than the other ones employing the same factor input. Since in
this model aggregate growth is driven solely by human capital accumulation, this shift of resources
towards education is at the root of the negative relationship between   Y g  and  n s  when  d  is
sufficiently high.
From Table 1 we also notice that the share of total income devoted to the purchase of
technologically advanced goods (l ) is positively correlated with  j s  and negatively correlated
with  Y s . As in  Blackburn et al. (2000), instead, the consumers’ decision about how much time to
invest in education and training ( H s ) is exclusively driven by  r  and d  (and independent on  l
and a ). Via returns to specialization ( a a l / ) 1 ( - ), both the growth rate of the economy ( Y g )
and  n s  depend positively on l . Because of this last effect, R goes down when l  increases.25
Finally, it is important pointing out that variations in a  do play an important role in shaping the
equilibrium allocation of human capital between sectors ( a / 1  is positively correlated with  n s  and
Y s  and negatively correlated with  j s ). More importantly, the present analysis shows that
introducing in the simplest possible way human capital accumulation in a generalization of  the
basic Grossman and Helpman model (1991, Chap. 3, pp. 43/57) without knowledge spillovers
delivers an unambiguously positive correlation between imperfect competition ( a / 1 ) and growth
( Y g ) when  1 0 < < l . The intuition behind this result goes as follows. Looking at the production
function of the homogeneous final good, one realises that in the steady-state equilibrium (with x
constant), an increase in the level of output may be determined either by the growth of  Y H , or the
growth of n, or the growth of both. Since the growth of n is induced (for the complementarity
hypothesis between human and technological capital) by the growth of H (independent of the
                                               
25 Indeed, R is also equal to  n s C ￿ - / ) ( r d .23
mark-up rate), the only way for the market power to influence output growth is through varying
the level of  Y H . In turn,  Y H  can be decomposed in two parts:
H s H Y Y ￿ ” ,  H H s Y Y / = .
While a variation in  a / 1  has no effect on the schooling decision of the household, an increase in
the market power variable exerts an unambiguously positive effect on  Y s . In other words, it is
through allocating a higher share of human capital towards the final output sector that monopoly
power positively affects growth in the model.
In principle this result may seem counterintuitive since previous papers (notably Aghion-
Dewatripont-Rey, 1997; Aghion-Harris-Vickers, 1997) and Aghion and Howitt (1996, 1998b))
clearly maintain that product market competition is unambiguously good for growth. Still, this
conclusion hinges on the assumption that the engine of growth is the continuous improvement of
the quality level of already existing goods. In comparison with these approaches what the present
paper shows is that results concerning the long run relationship between competition and growth
might well change within a horizontal differentiation model of endogenous growth featuring the
following two characteristics: the true lever to economic growth is human capital accumulation
and the choice of utility-maximasing agents to invest in formal education complements the one of
profit-seeking firms to invent new varieties of intermediate goods.
6.  Technology, the sectoral distribution of human capital and the
   interplay between market power and growth under some special cases.
All the results stated up to now have been obtained under the assumptions that d  is strictly
greater than  r 26 and  l  is strictly between zero and one. In this section, while keeping the
assumption that  r d > , we study how the sectoral distribution of human capital and the
relationship between imperfect competition and growth do change when  l  is assumed to be
respectively equal to zero, one and  a  (i.e., when the production function in the downstream
sector varies).
                                               
26 This hypothesis assures that the human capital accumulation rate is positive in the long run equilibrium.24
Case (a):  0 = l .
In this case the technologies adopted in each economic sector (in the symmetric long-run
equilibrium) read as:
t t aH Y = ,
d
r A
a ” (for the final goods production);
jt jt h B x ￿ = ,  ( ) t n j , 0 " (for the capital goods production);
nt t H C n ￿ =
•
(for research);
t t h h ￿ - =
•
) ( r d (for human capital supply),
and the model we are dealing with is the Rebelo (1991)-Lucas (1988) one or “Ah-model”. The
main variables of the model assume the following values:
   0 = j s ;
d
r
= Y s ; 0 = n s ;
d
r d -
= H s ; d = r ; 
(32)  r d - = = = = = = = = Y a c H n H H H g g g g g g g g
n j Y .
As is well known, both in Rebelo (1991) and Lucas (1988), technical progress happens through
devoting resources to physical (human) capital accumulation rather than a deliberate R&D activity
aimed at expanding the set of available (horizontally differentiated capital goods). In case (a) this
is reflected in the fact that the intermediate inputs do not enter the final goods production
technology and  0 = = n j s s . Thus, all the human capital is distributed between the final output
( Y s ) and education ( H s ) sectors.
Since capital goods are not productive inputs, market power ( a / 1 ), which in the model
outlined in the previous sections emerges from the intermediate sector, does not play any role on
the growth rate of output ( Y g ). As in Lucas (1988), this last coincides with the growth rate of
human capital and is equal to the difference between the productivity of the schooling technology
( r = d )27 and the subjective discount rate ( r ).  Finally, it is worth noticing that, in a long run
equilibrium where each sector gets a constant fraction of the available stock of human capital,  Y s
                                               
27 See again Lucas (1988).25
affects only the level of output ( t Y t H As Y = ), whereas its growth rate is solely driven by  H s
( H Y s g ￿ =d ).
Case (b):  1 = l .
In this case the technologies adopted in each economic sector (in the symmetric long-run
















jt t dj x A Y ,  (for the final goods production);
jt jt h B x ￿ = ,  ( ) t n j , 0 " (for the capital goods production);
nt t H C n ￿ =
•
(for research);
t t h h ￿ - =
•
) ( r d (for human capital supply),
and the model we are dealing with is the Lucas (1988)-Grossman and Helpman (1991, Chap. 3,
pp.  43/57) one. The main variables of the model assume the following values:
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In this case human capital enters only indirectly (through the capital goods) the final output
technology, whereas it continues to be employed in all the remaining sectors ( 0 = Y s  and  j s ,  n s
and  H s  are all positive). As in the previous case, the accumulation rate of human capital is equal in
equilibrium to  r d - , but now the growth rate of output ( Y g ) depends positively and
unambiguously on the mark-up rate ( a / 1 ). The reason is that in the present case  Y g  is a function















and it is easy to show that  0













. In other words, in this particular case, unlike
what happens when  1 0 < < l , it is through allocating a higher share of human capital from the
intermediate sector ( 0 ) / 1 ( / < ¶ ¶ a j s ) towards the research sector that monopoly power positively
affects growth.
Case (c):  a l = .
The last special case we want to deal with in this section is the case where  a l = .28  Under this
assumption the technologies adopted in each economic sector (in the symmetric long-run
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In the present case human capital is employed in each economic sector. Thus, we can identify this
case (unlike the two previous ones) as that in which the inter-sectoral competition for the same
input (skilled workers) is tougher ( j s , Y s , n s  and  H s  are all positive). As in the previous cases, the
accumulation rate of human capital is equal in equilibrium to  r d - , but now (unlike case (b))  the
                                               
28 This is the only case considered in Bucci (2002b), where the market power and the returns to specialization are
not disentengled (they both depend exclusively on a  in a symmetric long-run equilibrium).27
relationship between  n s  and  a / 1  is non-monotonic and the growth rate of output ( Y g ) is a
positive and non-linear (concave) function of the mark-up rate ( a / 1 ).
The main results concerning the relationship between the production technology in use in the
downstream sector, the inter-sectoral distribution of human capital, the monopoly power and the
aggregate growth rate within an integrated model of R&D and human capital accumulation is
summarised by the following propositions:
Result 1
In a generalised, integrated  growth model of deterministic R&D activity and human capital
accumulation where the true engine of growth is represented by the supply of skilled workers à la
Lucas (1988), as the one described by the equilibrium equations (20) through (27) and (1a),
there always exists (except when  0 = l ) a positive relationship between monopoly power ( a / 1 )
and aggregate growth ( Y g ).
Proof:
See equations (1a), (32), (33) and (34).
The reason why there exists no relationship between market power and growth when  0 = l  is that
in this case there is neither an intermediate sector, nor a research one (accordingly, the output
growth rate is completely independent on the mark-up that arises in the model from the capital
goods sector). Throughout the main text we have already given the intuition for the result of a
positive relationship between  a / 1  and  Y g  in the other cases. What such a result seems to suggest
is the following: as for the long-run relationship between monopoly power (measured in terms of
elasticity of substitution among capital goods) and growth, we may substantially replicate the same
result obtained in the basic Schumpeterian model of growth29 using an horizontal product
differentiation model where the true engine of growth is human capital accumulation and skilled
workers and technological capital are complements to each other in the very long run.
                                               
29 Notably, Aghion and Howitt (1992).28
Result 2
In a generalised, integrated  growth model of deterministic R&D activity and human capital
accumulation where the true engine of growth is represented by the supply of skilled workers à la
Lucas (1988), as the one described by the equilibrium equations (20) through (27) and (1a), both
the type of technology being used in the final output sector and the inter-sectoral competition for
the (growing) human capital do affect the relationship between aggregate growth ( Y g ) and
monopoly power ( a / 1 ).
Indeed, such a relationship is linear in case (b) – where human capital is not directly employed in
the final output sector, whose technology is of the CES type – and concave in case (c) – where
human capital is used everywhere and the final output technology is (an extension of)
Cobb/Douglas. Similar results are obtained in a model where the growth engine is the R&D
externality and there is no human capital accumulation (see Results 1 and 2 in Bucci (2002a)).
Result 3
In a generalised, integrated  growth model of deterministic R&D activity and human capital
accumulation where the true engine of growth is represented by the supply of skilled workers à la
Lucas (1988), as the one described by the equilibrium equations (20) through (27) and (1a), both
the type of technology being used in the final output sector and the inter-sectoral competition for
the (growing) human capital do affect the level of the equilibrium growth rate. This last is higher
whenever the final output technology is CES and does not employ human capital.
Proof:
From equations (32), (33) and (34) one easily concludes that:  Y g (case b) >  Y g (case c) >
Y g (case a).
This result parallels Results 3 and 4 of Bucci (2002a). Therefore, also when human capital is
allowed to grow over time the highest possible growth rate is obtained within a Grossman and
Helpman-type economy. On the contrary, in the present context, the lowest growth rate does
prevail in a Rebelo-Lucas-type-economy, where the final output technology is linear in the human
capital input and all the existing markets (final output and education) are perfectly competitive.29
7.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have analysed the steady-state predictions of an endogenous growth model
with both purposive R&D activity and human capital accumulation where the engine of growth is
represented by the supply of skills à la Lucas (1988). In the economy, human and technological
capital are complements to each other and there exists no pecuniary externality in their
accumulation process. In addition, it has been assumed that human capital enters as an input in all
the sectors in order to analyse the economic forces underlying the inter-sectoral distribution of
skilled workers. Using a theoretical framework where technological progress shows up in the form
of the creation of new horizontally differentiated capital goods, the long-run relationship between
imperfect competition and growth has also been addressed.  The results of the model can be
summarised as follows. First of all, the steady-state human capital accumulation depends solely on
the parameters describing preferences and the productivity of the schooling technology. As a
consequence, since the true engine of growth is represented by the supply of skills, the model does
not display any scale effect. Many other endogenous growth models nowadays share this property.
Secondly, we founded that the share of human capital devoted to research is not monotonically
increasing in the steady-state growth rate of output and depends positively on the market power
enjoyed by intermediate producers. Finally, as for the impact of monopoly power on the other
main variables of the model, the presence of imperfect competition conditions among the capital
goods producers turns out to have always positive growth effects (except when the share of
national income spent on the purchase of capital goods is exactly equal to zero) and may
dramatically influence the allocation of the reproducible factor input (human capital) to the
economic sectors employing it. We think this is as an important as an alternative result in
comparison with other papers that, unlike the approach taken here, consider the technological
progress as basically stemming from a continuous vertical differentiation process.
In the light of these results, two important questions still remain open in the future research
agenda. First, a through empirical test on the economic determinants of the long-run allocation of
human capital among alternative uses (with particular emphasis to the R&D activity) deserves
surely further attention. Secondly, it would be worth studying how the results obtained here would30
change if one assumed that economic growth is simultaneously induced by two engines of growth
(schooling investment and R&D activity).
APPENDIX
In this Appendix, I derive the set of results (20) through (25) in the main text.
From equation (12), when  h g  is constant  t u  turns out to be constant as well. This means that in
equilibrium the household devotes a constant fraction of its own time endowment to working (u)
and education (1-u) activities. Consequently, the optimal u (u*) will be constant and endogenously
determined through the solution to the household decision problem. Consider now this problem
(equations (10) through (12) in the main text), whose first order conditions (equations (13)
through (16)) are reported below for convenience, together with the consumer’s constraints and
the transversality conditions:
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From now on I will omit in this appendix the index t near the time dependant variables. Combining
















In a symmetric steady state equilibrium  Y H ,  j H ,  n H  and n all grow at the same constant rate as
H  (denoted by  H g ). This in turn implies that x (the output produced in this symmetric equilibrium
by each local monopolist, and equal to  n BH j / ) is constant over time and (from equations (4’)31
and (19c) in the main text) the wage rate accruing to one unit of skilled labour ( w w w Y j = = )
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. Then, using equation (14) in this appendix, we get:
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This means that in equilibrium (when  H g  is constant), the real interest rate (r) is constant as well.
From equation (6) in the main text it follows that the instantaneous profit accruing to each capital
goods’ producer does grow at the rate  H g
a
a l ) 1 ( -
 as well. Hence, through simple computations,
equation (9) in the main text may be re-written as:
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According to the equation above, the market value (the discounted flow of future profits) of a
generic j-th intermediate firm (equal to the market value of the corresponding j-th idea) grows in
the long run equilibrium at the rate  H g
a
a l ) 1 ( -
. Using equations (8) in the main text and (9a)
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Employing equations (18a) and (4’) in the main text and equation (9b) above, we get:
(4) 






whereas using equations (18b), (4’) and (19c) in the main text, the result comes out that:
(5) 
) 1 (













H j Y .32
Combining equations (13) and (15), we find the usual Euler equation, giving the optimal
household’s consumption path:






) 1 ( -
+ - = - = ”
•
.
Dividing both sides of equation (11) by a, we get:
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We already know that in the steady-state equilibrium r, u and  a g  are constant. Therefore, for the
ratio c/a to be constant it should be the case that  a wh / is constant. Indeed, h  grows at the
rate H g , w ( n j Y w w w = = = ) grows at the rate  H g
a
a l ) 1 ( -
 and  H a g g
a




we can conclude that in equilibrium the growth rate of  a wh /  is equal to zero and the ratio c/a is
constant. In other words, consumption (c) and asset holdings (a) do grow at the same constant
rate along a balanced growth path. This implies that:
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Finally, to find out the optimal u* one first equates equation (6) in this appendix with the value of
a g  and obtains:
(9)  r d - = = = = = H n H H H g g g g g
n j Y .




r d d = ￿ - = - = ”
•




For  H g  to be strictly positive,  d  should be strictly greater than  r , which in turn implies
1 * 0 < < u . When  0 > - = r d H g , the real interest rate and the growth rate of consumption and
asset holdings become respectively:
                                               
30 This follows immediately from the fact that  n nV a =  (equation (19) in the main text),  H n g g =  (for the
complementarity hypothesis between human and technological capital) and  H V g g
n a
a l ) 1 ( -
=  (see equation (9a) in
this appendix).33
(3’’)  0
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) ( r g g a c >0.
Also notice that when r and  a g  assume the values written above and  r d - = H g , then the two
transversality conditions are trivially checked since:
0 lim lim 0 10 1 = ￿ ￿ = ￿
-
+¥ ﬁ +¥ ﬁ
t
t t t t e a a
r m m , and
0 lim lim 0 20 2 = ￿ ￿ = ￿
-
+¥ ﬁ +¥ ﬁ
t
t t t t e h h
r m m .
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